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I.  STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Apart from campaign finance, federal and state legislators are subject 
to antidemocratic internal rules, personal or staff conflicts of interest, 
secrecy in deals struck, and information imbalance favoring special, 
organized interests.  The problem is not confined to Congress, but, in 
roughly parallel fashion, affects all fifty state legislatures, which 
together consider 150,000 bills annually, 37,000 of which become law—
seventy-five times the number enacted by Congress.1 
II.  CURRENT PROBLEMS 
A.  Bias 
The most pervasive bias of general concern is favoritism for those 
with a proprietary, short-term stake in public policy.  Apart from the 
campaign finance issue are issues of lobbying, job interchange, and 
information access. 
1.  Legislator Conflicts of Interest 
At the federal level as well as in some states, legislators must disclose 
personal holdings that might impact their official decisions.  What are 
the coverage problems in current law?  Is disclosure enough of a check? 
Note that legislators are often not prohibited from dealing with those 
having public business before them.  Problems particularly arise with 
legislators who are attorneys maintaining law firm ties.  Because of the 
attorney-client privilege, special interests can often hire legislators or 
those close to them without detection.  How can such conflicts be 
prevented statutorily or otherwise? 
2.  Job Interchange: The “Deferred Bribe” 
Related to the above, many legislators work closely with lobbyists 
whose employers have a financial stake in legislative business.  
Legislators are commonly hired as lobbyists themselves or are otherwise 
hired by such interests after leaving the legislature.  It is difficult to 
detect a promise to hire made to a legislator while still in office and 
casting official votes. 
 
 1. See State Action, State Legislatures and Resources, at http://www.cfpa.org/ 
statemap.cfm (last visited Feb. 1, 2003). 
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3.  Staff Job Interchange 
How do we prevent excessive self-interested bias of legislative staff?  
Currently, staff members receive job offers and often leave public 
employment for lobbying jobs with profit-stake interests.  Should we 
require professional staff to refuse for a period of time (one year, two 
years, or longer) any employment with a profit-stake interest having 
business before the public office he or she serves?  Some states ban 
former agency officials from appearing before the agency that 
previously employed them for one year after employment ends.  But is 
that enough, given the limited definition of lobbying and the deferred 
bribe impact of a job offer made while still in public employ? 
III.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A.  The Oaks Model2 
One proposed solution is to work in reverse: rather than prohibiting 
importuning offers made to a public official, focus on the official.  
Under the Oaks model, enacted in three California cities in 2000, public 
officials essentially enter into a contract when they take local office.  It 
provides that public compensation for that office is paid with the 
understanding that all decisions made will be “on the merits” and 
without regard to the personal financial gain of the public official.  
Where such public officials distribute millions or billions of dollars in 
public benefits, exemptions, and privileges, they agree to not personally 
profit from any person or group that has received substantially 
disproportionate public benefits based on their decisions.  Hence, a 
legislator voting to grant huge subsidies to the dairy industry would 
agree that for a period of five years or until two years after leaving that 
public office, whichever is longer, he or she will not accept any 
honorarium, gift, job, or campaign contribution from a person or 
industry benefiting from his or her vote.  Decisions are to be made on 
the merits. 
 
 2. For a copy of an Oaks initiative, see The Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer 
Rights, Oaks Proposal, available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/citizen/rp/ (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2003). 
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B.  Other Models 
Other models require placement of assets in blind trust, prohibit law 
practice while serving in public office, or impose conflict of interest 
standards closer to those applicable to judges.  What alternatives might 
accomplish the neutral decisionmaking goal? 
IV.  INFORMATION AND ADVOCACY IMBALANCE 
Even where a legislator lacks personal financial bias and wants to 
make a decision on the merits, he or she must have balanced information 
from which to decide.  That is not currently the case. 
A.  Lobbying 
California has 1600 registered lobbyists.3  Of this total, one full-time 
person and one half-time person represent the interests of children.  
Several other lobbyists represent service providers who attend to 
children in various ways, but their perspective may not be the same as a 
long range interest in their clients or customers.  Other states have 
similar imbalances and, at the federal level, over 20,000 lobbyists ply the 
halls of Congress, with very few representing diffuse, disadvantaged, or 
future interests.4  Given the complexity of public issues and the press of 
business, many public officials view their role as that of mediators 
between groups contending for their attention and favor.  This “vector” 
view of legislators is implicit in the current legislative process federally 
and in most states.  How can the current imbalance be redressed to allow 
our ethical sensibilities toward our children and our legacy to transcend 
the advocacy currently extant? 
We currently regulate lobbying by requiring certain disclosures and by 
generally prohibiting excessive gifts or cash payments by lobbyists 
directly to legislators.  Does this limitation solve the problem of access 
and preferential influence by monied interests? 
Some possible solutions to consider include: (1) apply ex parte 
restrictions to legislators and elevate the public hearing process; (2) 
subsidize charity and nonprofit advocacy, not profit-stake lobbying; and 
(3) publicly financed independent information. 
 
 
 3. Cal-Access, Welcome to Lobbying Activity, at http://cal-access.ss.ca.gov/Lobbying/ 
Lobbyists/calaccess.aspx?letter=A&sort=&session-2001 (last visited Feb. 1, 2003). 
 4. Your Congress.com, Lobbyists FAQ, at http://www.yourcongress.com/ 
ViewArticle.asp?article_id=63 (last visited Feb. 1, 2003). 
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1.  Apply Ex Parte Restrictions to Legislators; Elevate the Public 
Hearing Process 
Should legislators operate more like judges, subject to such restrictions as 
ex parte contact limitations?  Currently, most bills are heard in committees, 
where testimony is delivered and exhibits presented.  However, much of 
the committee process is window dressing while real decisions are made 
in offices during visits by lobbyists who have access.  These lobbyists 
know the background and personal histories of legislators they visit.  
They know which buttons to push in privately arguing for or against 
legislation.  What if hearings were made more meaningful by treating 
them more like judicial hearings?  Parties are expected to make their 
point in public and subject to cross-examination.  They do not make 
private appeals that can be misleading or would be easily rebuttable if 
made in public.  Why do we preserve such evidentiary fairness when a 
decision by a public official—a judge—is made concerning the rights of 
a single litigant, but then eschew it when a decision is made affecting the 
rights of millions? 
Instead of ex parte contact limitations, should legislators at least be 
required to disclose their contacts with parties interested in their official 
decisions? 
2.  Imbalance: Subsidize Charity and Nonprofit Advocacy,                     
Not Profit-Stake Lobbying 
Can we partly redress the current imbalance of advocacy favoring 
profit-stake interests?  Currently, we allow business and profit interests 
to deduct monies spent on lobbying as a “necessary business expense.”5  
This means that lobbying by profit-stake interests is twenty to forty 
percent subsidized by other taxpayers who must make up the taxes thus 
foregone.  Meanwhile, lobbying by those who lack a profit-stake, but 
whose interest is considered charitable, are denied or limited in their 
access to our legislators.  Should this not be reversed?  Why not end any 
deductibility of lobbying expenses and allow an assured percentage, 
something like twenty-five to fifty percent of the budget of nonprofit or 
charity qualifying entities to be expended for such advocacy? 
Should we pay compensation to those who provide information to 
legislators on behalf of general, disadvantaged, or future interests?  How? 
 
 5. See I.R.C. § 162 (2000). 
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3.  Publicly Financed Independent Information 
One way to moderate the information imbalance is for legislatures to have 
their own independent source of information about public policy options. 
Such information could come from institutional sources, such as 
general accounting offices, little Hoover Commissions, committee or 
party staffs, or from competent personal staffs.  Should legislators be 
required to devote a percentage of their office budgets for such policy 
staffing, as opposed to the district and constituent service function upon 
which so many of them focus almost exclusively?  How can we assure 
adequate and independent information from committee staff or from 
independent oversight agencies? 
B.  Impact of Term Limits 
What is the impact of term limits on the advocacy and information 
imbalance between short-term profit interests and longer-term interests?  
On the one hand, such limits may prevent the development of sinecures, 
free from public check, and may stimulate new blood and new ideas.  On 
the other hand, they may make legislators even more dependent on the 
current information imbalance and may facilitate much mischief by 
outsiders able to manipulate a legislature now lacking an institutional 
memory and amenable to shallow sound bite arguments.  For example, 
California’s short limits—six years in the Assembly and eight years in 
the Senate6—combined with cuts in legislative resources for staffing and 
information, have made legislators more dependent on outside lobbying 
influence, which favors special interests.  These term limits have also 
magnified the effect of campaign contribution influence, as officials 
must gear up for expensive races before new constituencies much more 
often.  Is there a different term limit formulation that could advance 
stated goals without such collateral effect? 
V.  BYPASSING THE LEGISLATURE 
Some states allow the electorate to bypass the legislature by enacting 
statutes, and even constitutional amendments, by direct popular vote.  
The initiative and referendum process has become an important 
democratic safety valve. 
However, some problems have impeded the proper functioning of this 
process in many states.  First, special interests have gained access to the 
 
 6. See California the Golden State, Compiled by the Office of the Chief Clerk  
Assembly of the State of California, at http://www.assembly.ca.gov/clerk/BILLSLEGIS 
LATURE/goldenstate.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2003). 
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public forum by paying for signatures to qualify propositions.  Second, 
they respond to most citizen initiated proposals with fake 
counterproposals of their own.  Third, they spend millions of dollars on 
deceptive political advertising, which rarely identifies the actual vested 
interest financing the ad. 
Another problem with initiatives has been their high rate of court 
reversal, usually based on language that might well be corrected if 
subjected to the kind of examination that bills receive in the normal 
legislative course.  However, the inflexible format of initiatives requires 
them to be voted upon as stated in the qualifying initiative. 
Are there reforms that might strengthen the initiative process without 
stimulating its capture by special interests?  Can we provide public 
legal assistance to petition proponents regarding questions of 
constitutionality and consistency with existing law—similar to the 
Office of Legislative Counsel available to legislators?  Can we treat 
volunteer gathering of signatures differently than signatures gathered 
by “hired gun” paid collectors?  How can we police campaign deceit, 
or can we?  How can we require identity disclosure of initiative ad 
proponents and opponents?7 
VI.  PUBLIC ACCESS 
The internal rules of the legislature inevitably relate to media attention 
and public responsiveness.  If business is conducted in private, without 
public vote, then the special interests that dominate such an environment 
will often prevail.  California, for example, has a “suspense file” 
procedure allowing legislators and the governor to kill bills supported by 
the broad population without accountability or public vote.8  How can it 
be prevented or countered? 
Related to accountability are the sunshine provisions of the Congress 
and state legislatures.  Many legislatures have exempted themselves 
from the same public records and open meeting provisions that they 
apply to local governments and executive branch agencies.  Why should 
they not live by the same standards? 
How transparent and fair are the legislative rules themselves?  What 
 
 7. See, e.g., Cal. Prolife Council PAC v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 
1998) (problematic decision analyzing the constitutionality of California’s proposition 
208). 
 8. STANDING R. OF THE ASSEMBLY 58.2, available at http://carecure.rutgers.edu/Quest/ 
California/Rules%20of%20the%20Assembly#AR58.2 (last visited Feb. 1, 2003). 
PRINTERLEGISLATIVE REFORM.DOC 1/15/2020  3:44 PM 
 
74 
are the highest priorities for reform in this area? 
Anyone who has advocated before any legislature has witnessed the 
common arrogance of its membership.  Hearings are abruptly canceled 
or conducted with little respect for the citizens who wish to comment, 
even those who travel hundreds of miles at great cost to tell their stories.  
Time limitations may prevent input from everyone who wants to be 
heard, but the atmosphere in many state legislatures is deference to 
members and longstanding lobbyists along with open disdain for citizens 
who are not “heavy hitters.”  What can be done to stimulate internal 
rules assuring open proceedings, public votes, and accountability? 
Are those who represent broad citizen concerns effective lobbyists?  A 
recent survey of child advocates found them to be relatively impotent 
factors in influencing state legislative outcomes.  Would a higher level 
of professionalism help?  How is that accomplished without taking on 
the negative attributes of an inside player? 
VII.  MEDIA ATTENTION 
In order for the interests of the impoverished to be advanced, 
decisionmakers must be without excessive money based bias, and 
information and advocacy must be balanced.  But beyond this, the issues 
relevant to those interests must be raised.  They must be on the public 
agenda table.  Increasingly, the media sets that agenda.  Underrepresented 
interests are of concern to the body politic.  Elected officials tend to 
respond quickly and sensitively to issues raised by the media and 
receiving the attention of the populace. 
How do we influence the media to address matters of concern to the 
dispossessed or to the longer range future?  The media is poor at 
covering subjects that lack a journalistic “handle,” including social 
trends which are gradual, even if massive and important, such as child 
poverty or widespread privacy loss.  How do we facilitate such coverage 
for legislative attention? 
In addition to the selection of a legislative agenda, the media is the 
critical card available to the public interest advocate when an issue is 
before a legislature.  It may allow for partial redress of advocacy 
imbalance among those lobbying the legislature, and it gives a weapon to 
those who lack campaign finance or direct membership assets.  How do 
we take advantage of it? 
Beyond media access, what impact does increasing concentration of 
media ownership have on the composition of legislatures and their 
publicly driven agendas?  Rupert Murdock controls the communications 
satellite on three continents and is now negotiating to buy Direct TV, 
one of America’s two national satellite systems.  Two cable firms 
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control the other national satellite system.  Cable concentration is 
extreme, with local monopolies being the rule, absent meaningful rate 
regulation.  Two firms, AT&T and Time Warner, now control eighty 
percent of the national cable communications market.  One of them has 
now combined with the nation’s largest Internet service provider, and 
both (dominating high speed Internet access) have contended they can 
confine consumer choice to their own designated Internet service 
provider.9  In combination with the relaxation of cross ownership rules 
and the decline of the Fairness Doctrine, the ascension of “free market” 
regulators, where a free market is lacking, is particularly dangerous, 
given the First Amendment implications extant—all of which may be 
momentous as applied to legislative elections and media coverage of the 
Congress and state legislatures. 
VIII.  LOBBYING AND FOUNDATION SUPPORT 
Many foundations labor under the misapprehension that their § 501(c)(3) 
status absolutely prohibits “lobbying.”  It is “political.”  In fact, the 
absolute ban on political involvement applies to candidate elections.10  
The definition of lobbying is relatively narrow under federal and state 
law, and a substantial increase in the “education of public officials” from 
those without a proprietary stake in public policy is both lawful and 
desirable.  Why are some foundations afraid?  Why do so many seem to 
direct funding not to leveraged change, but to pilot projects, studies, and 
spending without likely impact?  What can be done to make advocacy 
funding a part of their agenda? 
IX.  COMPOSITION 
The composition of legislatures turns on elections, entry opportunity, 
campaign finance support, redistricting, ease of registration and voting, 
voting accuracy, and other democratic mechanisms.  What are the 
current structural impediments to the election of those legislators, based 
on informed exercise of democratic will from the bottom, rather than on 
manipulation from incumbents or others at the top?11 
 
 9. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).  
 10. I.R.C. § 501(c) (2000). 
 11. See Miles Rapoport, Democracy’s Moment: Can the Debacle of 2000 Ignite a 
Movement for the Democratic Renewal?, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 12–16, 2001, at 41. 
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*   *   *   *   * 
X. BACKGROUND ON PANELISTS 
Matthew Myers is president and chief legal counsel of the Campaign 
for Tobacco-Free Kids, a privately funded organization established to 
focus the nation’s attention and action on reducing tobacco use among 
children.  In his previous role as executive vice president, he oversaw all 
of the Campaign’s advocacy, outreach, and grassroots development 
efforts. 
Myers is a nationally recognized tobacco control advocate.  In 1996 he 
received the “Smokefree America Award,” as the lawyer who made the 
greatest contribution to tobacco control efforts in the United States.  In 
1989 he was awarded the prestigious Surgeon General’s Medallion from 
Dr. C. Everett Koop, for contributions to the public health of the nation.  
Former FTC chair and author Michael Pertschuk featured Myers’s 
legislative advocacy efforts in his book, The Giant Killers.12 
He joined the Campaign after a fifteen-year partnership in the 
Washington, D.C. law firm of Asbill, Junkin & Myers, where he 
specialized in complex commercial litigation and cases concerning 
employment law, the Privacy Act, health law, and First Amendment 
issues.  First as staff director and then as counsel to the Coalition on 
Smoking or Health, an organization comprised of the American Cancer 
Society, the American Lung Association, and the American Heart 
Association, he has testified before Congress and agencies of the 
executive branch. 
Jamie Court is executive director for the nonprofit Foundation for 
Taxpayer and Consumer Rights in Santa Monica, California.  He is the 
author of Making A Killing: HMOs and the Threat to Your Health.13  In 
1994 Court, along with consumer advocate Harvey Rosenfield, established 
Consumers for Quality Care, the health care watchdog project of the 
Foundation, to protect the public interest in high quality health care.  
Court was named “Consumer Educator of the Year” by the Consumer 
Attorneys Association of Los Angeles in 1998 and “Patient Rights 
Advocate of the Year” in 1996 by Consumer Attorneys of California.  
He is a frequent media commentator and contributor.  Prior to his 
insurance reform efforts, Court was a homeless advocate and community 
organizer.  He is a graduate of Pomona College in Claremont, California. 
Charles Halpern was the founding president of the Nathan Cummings 
Foundation from 1989 through November 2000.  The Foundation’s areas 
 
 12. MICHAEL L. PERTSCHUK, GIANT KILLERS 53–54, 56–61 (1986). 
 13. JAMIE COURT, MAKING A KILLING: HMOS AND THE THREAT TO YOUR HEALTH 
(1999), available at http://www.makingakilling.org/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2003). 
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of interest are health, the arts, the environment, and Jewish life. 
He is the chair of the boards of the Center for Contemplative Mind in 
Society and Dēmos: A Network for Ideas and Action.  Beginning in 
March 2001, he will divide his time between Berkeley, California, and 
New York City. 
The founding dean of CUNY Law School, Halpern was also a founder 
of the Center for Law and Social Policy in the 1970s, a seminal center of 
public interest advocacy.  He helped to create the Mental Health Law 
Project and has taught at Georgetown and Stanford law schools. 
Gene Kimmelman, co-director of Consumers Union’s Washington, 
D.C. office, is responsible for management of the office, as well as 
oversight of all federal advocacy issues.  He has extensive expertise in a 
wide variety of public policy issues, including telecommunications, 
cable television, product liability, antitrust law, and health care. 
Kimmelman is a recognized expert on deregulation and consumer 
protection issues, particularly in the area of telecommunications.  He 
was the lead consumer advocate on the Omnibus Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 and was successful in advocating the addition of significant 
consumer protections to the telecommunications deregulation legislation. 
Prior to joining Consumers Union, Kimmelman served for two years 
as chief counsel and staff director for the Antitrust Subcommittee of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee.  Prior to that, he was legislative director for 
the Consumer Federation of America, where he directed CFA’s 
legislative, regulatory, and judicial intervention program.  He began his 
career as a consumer advocate and staff attorney for Public Citizen 
Congress Watch. 
Wendy Wendlandt is the national political director for the National 
Association of State Public Interest Research Groups (PIRG) and has 
held that position since 1992.  In this capacity, Wendlandt has assisted 
many of the state PIRGs in developing and running campaigns, 
including CalPIRG’s 1996 campaign finance reform ballot initiative, 
proposition 212,14 which called for $100 contribution limits to 
candidates.  She was also a principal advisor in the effort that same year 
to gather 1.5 million signatures to qualify proposition 212 and three 
additional measures for the California ballot. 
In 2000, she and the state PIRGs, along with six other organizations, 
 
 14. See CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION 42–47 (1996), 
available at http://holmes.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1996g.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 
2003).  
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launched Genetically Engineered Food Alert, the national call for a 
moratorium on the use of genetically engineered crops and ingredients 
until they are safety tested, labeled, and under which companies that 
produce them are held liable for any damages.  The GE Food Alert 
Campaign was responsible for uncovering the illegal use of Starlink corn 
in taco shells, among 500 other products.  In 1999, Wendlandt also 
helped to found the Genetic Engineering Action Network (GEAN) as the 
U.S. network of genetic engineering activists, and she continues to chair 
its steering committee. 
She has been with the PIRGs since 1984, working in a variety of 
capacities, including serving as the executive director of the PIRG in 
Washington State, where she played key roles in two statewide ballot 
measure campaigns—one to establish a state toxic waste Superfund 
cleanup program and one to stop Hanford from becoming the nation’s 
first high level nuclear waste dump site—and led legislative efforts on a 
variety of public interest issues, including motor voter registration and 
pesticide reduction. 
Wendlandt is a trustee of the Green Century Funds, the nation’s only 
family of socially responsible mutual funds founded and owned by 
nonprofit environmental organizations.  She is on the board of Green Corps, 
the field school for environmental organizing, and has served as one of 
its lead trainers since its inception in 1991.  She also serves as the associate 
director for CalPIRG, the California Public Interest Research Group.  
She has a B.A. in Political Science from Whitman College, 1983. 
XI. PANEL DISCUSSION15 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
We are going to discuss this in dialogue form.  The critical question is: 
“What are the impediments to Congress, state legislatures, and other 
elected bodies doing the business of the public rather than the narrow 
special interests?” 
We’re here today to try to figure out how we look at the combination 
of the legislative rules and the public action steps that are necessary to 
overcome these problems.  What we’re going to try to do is to divide our 
conversation into two broad themes.  The first is a look at the insider 
rules themselves.  What are the rules at the congressional, state, and 
local levels that both enhance our ability to influence the process and 
 
 15. This Part has been edited to remove the minor cadences of speech that appear 
awkward in writing and to identify significant sources when first referred to by the 
speakers. 
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inhibit our ability to influence the process? 
Second, we’re going to ask ourselves the question of how to become 
more effective at influencing the process itself because we must 
remember that the people we are influencing are different than judges 
and administrative heads.  They are not appointed, but are ultimately 
accountable to the people.  That makes our advocacy itself quite 
different. 
Let me start with a question and open it up for a dialogue.  What are 
the major rule impediments?  What are the major rules that we need to 
change on the inside of the legislative process if we’re going to make it 
more responsive to the public interest?  Wendy, do you want to begin? 
WENDY WENDLANDT:  
Sure, I think I get to start because the states have some of the worst 
rules in allowing public interest voices to be heard.  All you need to do is 
visit Chuck Lewis’s web site at the Center for Public Integrity16 to see 
how terrible the states fare in terms of disclosure.  Half the states require 
literally no disclosure of the financial interests of their legislators. 
The second reason is because of the sheer volume of legislation passed 
through state legislatures.  It is about seventy-five times the number of 
laws passed in the Congress.  In 1999 about 150,000 bills were 
introduced at the state level, and about a quarter of those became law.17  
So we are talking about a lot of legislative action that obviously affects 
the public every single day. 
In terms of the rules, our experience in state legislatures across the 
country includes an overall dominant problem of committee chairs and 
leadership able to block the process—so a bill never moves anywhere.  
That is probably the single biggest problem and probably the problem 
that is most difficult to resolve. 
But we can do something about other things.  For example, we could 
require disclosure of every type of document through radio, television, 
and the Internet.  It is our tax dollars at work creating these documents; 
and, in order to shed a little light on the process, putting that material on 
the web or in other public forums seems essential. 
The third thing is access to the process—making sure we have 
 
 16. See The Center for Public Integrity, at http://www.publicintegrity.org/ 
dtaweb/home.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2003). 
 17. See State Action, State Legislatures and Resources, at http://www.cfpa.org/ 
statemap.cfm (last visited Feb. 1, 2003). 
PRINTERLEGISLATIVE REFORM.DOC 1/15/2020  3:44 PM 
 
80 
effective open meetings acts, including requiring advance disclosure of 
meeting times and prohibiting last minute changes.  It may seem 
shocking to some of you who deal with more progressive states like 
California or with the Congress, but, in many states, the meetings are 
changed at the last minute, and attendees are not even told in what room 
the hearing is happening.  So we are talking about basic reforms here. 
The fourth thing that I had on my list is basic ethics.  Crucial are 
conflict provisions ranging from recusal, where a legislator has a conflict 
of interest, to banning gifts and bribes.  Again, the range of these laws 
across the country is striking. 
The next area of needed reform is the recording of votes.  Again, this 
would seem a simple concept, but the recording of votes in committee or 
on the floor is often lacking.  Many times, we have floor votes by voice, 
where nobody can identify individual votes.  So we need to get votes 
recorded. 
The last thing on my list is a little more obscure: being able to force a 
floor vote on an issue.  We need to push issues out to the floor so they 
don’t just end up in a suspense file or in some committee—the dead bills 
committee.  Almost every state has something like that. 
Those are some quick things that would help us get access to the 
process.  Now, it does not fundamentally change the amount of money 
coming into the process or the amount of power we necessarily have in 
it, but those are just some simple things that we should be working to get 
into states across the country. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
Could I just probe a couple of them?  You started off with the 
disclosure of documents.  Since legislatures, unlike courts, don’t have to 
have a formal record before they act and often don’t have any record 
whatsoever, tell me a little bit more what you think in terms of 
disclosure of documents.  I can’t tell you the number of bills I’ve worked 
on in which, two years out, there is no record of the legislative history. 
WENDY WENDLANDT:  
Right.  Some of them are simple.  If there has been a public hearing, 
there ought to be a transcript, particularly in a big state such as 
California.  Down here in San Diego, it might cost up to $250 to fly up 
to Sacramento round trip, even if the ticket is purchased three weeks in 
advance.  The transcript of the hearing ought to be available on a Web 
site.  Some of the reforms are simple.  These things are already public, 
but are not distributed to a wide group of people. 
Another example would be lobby disclosure forms: financial interest, 
financial stake in companies, that type of information.  In many places it 
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is filed, but very difficult to access, and with the advent of the Internet, 
we ought to be able to just post that information.  In Congress, Gary 
Ruskin has been pushing this, to have congressional research documents 
available for public consumption.  As I understand it, those are only 
available to congressional staff.  Seventy-five million dollars or so is 
spent to produce those reports, which are actually quite good, and yet 
members of the public cannot get them without help from a staff person.  
So even though these documents are already produced, we need to 
expand their dissemination. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
Would you change the rules about the kind of evidence or the kind of 
information the Congress or legislature has to have before they act? 
WENDY WENDLANDT:  
I suppose that would be good.  It is a little bit like campaign finance 
reform.  What could we actually get in the next ten years?  I would think 
that the more information about legislative history, the better.  The idea 
that, here in California, Steve Peace, the primary author of the California 
deregulation bill, is now trying to refashion himself as the savior of the 
energy crisis is appalling.  It would be good to have on record some of 
the legislative history that led us to the fiasco in the first place. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
Gene, you work at the federal level.  Do you want to comment at all 
on this issue? 
GENE KIMMELMAN:  
Yes, a number of things Wendy mentioned just now are being 
considered in Congress to make all documents available, and that is 
something that the public interest community ought to be very involved 
in.  It’s not a sexy issue, but it’s obviously an essential one.  My reaction 
is that we have many of the things the states are lacking, to some extent, 
at the federal level.  Surely they need to be perfected there.  So I start off 
with the reaction that these are really necessary, and there is an awful lot 
of work that needs to be done here.  We are not close to making the 
public interest community more effective or making legislative bodies 
more responsive to us.  Maybe, in some instances, we ought to question 
exactly how far we want to push, as opposed to other use of our resources. 
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At the federal level there are committee reports with pretty strong 
disclosure requirements, like disclosure of financial interests and ethics 
rules—a little squishy.  Or maybe very squishy.  But at least there is 
disclosure—public access to that information.  A lot of the votes are 
recorded, not by requirement, but by tradition and political pressure.  So 
many things are already available at the federal level, and yet there are 
some of the same fundamental problems that exist at the state level in 
meeting public interest needs. 
But there are some twists here, including the ability of committee 
chairmen to block bills.  It has certainly been a tradition in the House of 
Representatives, and yet there is a way around it called a “discharge 
petition,” a very effective tool to identify who wants to supersede the 
power of a chairman.  I raise questions about how far we want to go 
down this path of democracy, because Republicans, as opposed to 
Democrats, have used it very effectively. 
Then, there is the filibuster rule in the Senate, which senators use to 
block a bill on the Senate floor.  A supermajority vote is required to 
overcome a filibuster.  In my experience of twenty years of doing this, 
our policy allies often use filibusters to block extremely dangerous 
legislation, yet filibusters are also used very efficiently by our 
opponents.  It is an extremely difficult problem to surpass. 
But the U.S. Senate is a good example where, even with committee 
chairmen blocking bills in committee and refusing to hear bills, there is a 
chance, somewhere along the line, to raise those provisions on the 
Senate floor because of procedural openings.  So there are always 
opportunities in the Senate.  But Congress, nevertheless, has many of the 
same resulting problems that the states have in passing public interest 
legislation. 
So we can identify improvements that need to be made at the federal 
level.  But some of these would take great effort, and I suggest that we 
may be better off redirecting our efforts at substantive matters, and not 
just the procedural rules. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
Wendy, how much do the type of rules that you are talking about truly 
serve as an impediment at the state level? 
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WENDY WENDLANDT:  
It is difficult to say.  PIRG is in a big expansion right now, adding 
advocates in many new states.  So we are moving into states that we 
have not worked in before.  What is difficult about it is that some of the 
rules aren’t even written down; so new advocates in the state legislature 
have a difficult time figuring out how the thing works.  So it is an 
impediment in the sense that an advocate literally can’t figure out how to 
run a campaign because it is unclear where it goes next and what rules 
might block the campaign along the way. 
There are obviously huge other problems, like being outspent by our 
opposition.  Campaign finance influences who is elected in the first 
place because of big money donors.  So it is a little difficult to say in the 
scheme of things what percentage of the problem this is.  But clearly, 
each place where we are getting pushed back is a problem for the public 
interest community. 
GENE KIMMELMAN:  
I wanted to add to this.  When we get past looking at just what is 
required and what information is available, there is a separate access 
issue that is truly a phenomenal development in Congress—the inability 
to get into hearings.  People, real people, cannot get into hearings.  There are 
so many line sitters starting in the wee hours of the morning when the 
buildings are opened—the buildings where these public hearings are 
being held—who are being paid by corporate interests to sit there until 
the lobbyists show up five minutes before the hearings start, so that they 
can have access to the public room.  Unless there are people who want to sleep 
there or who have extra staff or nothing else to do with their time, people 
in the public interest community, or even those in the general public who 
see a hearing notice, are never going to get in.  That is one of the most 
fundamental access problems today—another form of money in politics. 
CHARLES HALPERN:  
Let me just add this one point.  You asked, Matt, how big an 
impediment this is at the state level, and I think that is an important 
question.  But in some ways it is a question that is too limiting.  Even if 
the answer were that there is no impediment at all, we ought to be 
thinking about what an ideal legislative process would look like ten 
years from now, twenty years from now.  And if we had some image of 
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a legislative process that we were working toward, that would help us set 
priorities, as Gene suggested we are going to have to do, not because of 
the immediate impediment, but because we have some vision of what the 
world should look like.  I think that was touched on with the last panel 
with respect to campaign finance. 
If we start with something small like the McCain-Feingold bill, we 
may end up with a system in which the process is much more open to 
challenges to incumbents, in which Fanny Lou Hamer is going to be 
running for the Alabama legislature.  I think one of the ways that we, in 
the public interest world, can deepen and make our work more effective 
is to be thinking ahead of the crisis. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
It is interesting, Charlie, and one of the questions I would ask as we 
think about the perfect legislative process.  One thing that struck me in 
listening to Wendy’s suggestions, is that I could probably craft the 
perfect procedural legislative process, and then still ask myself the 
question at the end of the day whether the process will work for the 
people in it.  That does seem to be a fundamental question.  It is clearly 
not a reason not to seek the perfect legislative process, but it is a reason 
to say how much energy should be spent on those issues. 
WENDY WENDLANDT:  
Right.  But I think the whole question is around the tools of 
democracy.  We are so incredibly outspent, and it gets worse and worse 
every year, so that we need as many tools as we possibly can to have 
some parity in some set of circumstances.  That is the current situation, 
and that would not be my ideal world, but that is the situation we are in.  
So anything that provides more democracy is always better for us. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
And Gene was against more democracy? 
WENDY WENDLANDT:  
No, I know, that’s why I am looking at Gene, because we hear the 
word “initiative,” and people are concerned about the initiative process.  
The initiative process is something that maybe has gotten out of control.  
But I’m just firm in this: the more democracy the better because we are 
really screwed if more democracy is not good for the public interest. 
GENE KIMMELMAN:  
Just to clarify, I’m for it.  I think there are a lot of other things, given 
our resources, that we need to focus on before we get to that long-term 
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issue because, unless we can bridge the gap between us and the huge 
powers that be, procedural changes may not deliver us what we want. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
Before we move on to that issue, let me pose a broader question. 
Unlike in a court, where everything that takes place has to take place in a 
public recorded form, much of the legislative process takes place in a 
member’s office, or between two members walking down the hallway, 
or a member trading off an issue of concern to his or her constituency for 
another person’s constituency.  How would you address those issues, if 
at all?  Because if we are going to talk about making the process 
transparent, and therefore open, we still have to recognize that 
bargaining takes place.  Any suggestions? 
JAMIE COURT:  
The only way you can really deal with it is by going to the outside and 
bringing the outside in.  We had an issue with a legislator a couple of 
years ago who promised an insurance agent he would vote against a bill 
even though he agreed with it, so we had to make it public.  The 
legislator still hasn’t talked to us, but we went after him in his district 
and got press.  That is what the outside game right now is.  The other 
side, the corporations, have figured this out, which is why they’ve 
invested heavily in “astroturf technology”18—which is incredible 
lobbying technology. 
We had some bills to make “claims practices” for the insurance 
industry a little cleaner, and one of the ways the insurance industry tried 
to stop our efforts was by having an 800 number system where they 
literally hooked people up to their respective legislator’s office.  All 
policyholders in the state were informed by mailed notice to “call this 
800 number,” and they got hooked up to the legislator’s office to leave a 
message. They logged an inordinate amount of calls because of the 
money they spent to do that.  They brought the outside in. 
We don’t have that type of money, but what we do have is the 
initiative process in California.  In other places, we have the ability to 
work on building some grassroots capacity in order to make legislators 
pay from the outside.  Any facilities that create more opportunities for 
 
 18. The term “astroturf technology” refers to artificial grass roots support and 
concern manipulated by special interests. 
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empowering people on the outside are important.  Our group has worked 
mostly on the outside through the initiative process in California.  I have 
been involved in different issues, and it is interesting how the initiative, 
even when it doesn’t pass, even when it doesn’t succeed, can leverage 
pressure inside the legislature.  The most recent example is California’s 
energy crisis.  In the winter we were going very quickly toward a 
solution that would give the utilities and the energy producers almost 
everything they wanted.  In November we announced that our group was 
going to do an initiative to create a public power authority and place a 
windfall profits tax on power generators.  Suddenly, the Governor 
changed his direction, and ever since we have been fighting a war to 
capture the Governor’s attention and to go in a proper direction.  The 
only reason we have any leverage to do that, the only reason the 
Governor is listening to us—and he doesn’t call that often—is because 
we threatened an initiative on the ballot when he was up for re-election.  
Basically, that initiative would have suggested that he didn’t do a good 
enough job with the crisis, so we had to go directly to the people.  That 
type of leverage, that type of power, is the ultimate power.  There are 
ways that the initiative process has worked against people of average 
means because it is corruptible by money, and I hope we will get to that 
a little later, but it is one of the ultimate outside weapons. 
So I would agree with Gene that we need to find a way to bring more 
people from the outside into the process.  One of the ways we have done 
it is a group called the Oaks Project, which is part of the Foundation for 
Taxpayer and Consumer Rights.  This is something that Ralph Nader 
inspired in a speech he gave in Thousand Oaks, California, where he 
said we need a thousand Californians, rooted in their community, strong 
and sturdy as the California Oak, who will be citizen activists in their 
community and hold legislators accountable.  Each of these Oaks agrees 
to fifteen hours a month of volunteer time, signature gathering, letter 
writing, and lobbying.  That is a pretty significant commitment for people 
who work, which is why our number is in the hundreds rather than in the 
thousands.  But what they just did in several cities in California was 
pretty amazing.  They passed local initiatives in Vista, San Francisco, 
Santa Monica, Pasadena, and Clairemont that say any city official who 
votes to award a contract, or votes to confer a public benefit of 
substantial value on a private person, cannot take a dollar, a job, or even 
a campaign contribution from that person for five years after the benefit 
is given.  Now that is the toughest campaign finance reform law in the nation, 
and it is law in five cities right now.  The only reason it worked was 
because of the initiative process.  The Oaks had to collect about 75,000 
signatures, all volunteer signatures.  The general public does not hear 
about it much, but bringing in volunteers creates a new type of attention. 
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So I would agree with Gene that the more our groups can focus on the 
capacity issue, on bringing the average citizenry into what we do, the 
more leverage we’ll have—as opposed to focusing just on procedural 
rules. 
WENDY WENDLANDT:  
Well, Matt, there is one other area which is sort of halfway between 
outside organizing and procedural rules, and that is campaign finance 
reform and electoral reform.  As to the latter, reforms range from 
changing the size of legislative districts so they are smaller for more 
accountability, to instant runoff voting so people can rank their 
candidates, which would allow third party candidates to have an impact 
without sacrificing the second choice candidates preferred by a majority 
of voters.  These other things are not inside procedural rules, but they 
would change the composition of the legislature advantageously. 
JAMIE COURT:  
There is also “none of the above,” which is an interesting notion.  
Voters could choose “none of the above” and axe both candidates to get 
higher quality in future choices; this is something that we have delved 
into in the past. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
Do you think the Oaks Project initiative that you actually passed in 
several cities would work at the legislative level where campaigns are 
far more expensive?  In essence, what legislators are asked to do in those 
communities is to not benefit a campaign contributor—terrific idea.  
Would it work in a campaign to raise millions of dollars? 
JAMIE COURT:  
One of the hopes for the Oaks Project was that these people would 
ultimately become public interest candidates in their communities.  And, 
if we’re talking at a state assembly or state senator level, hopefully they 
would become known and have some type of persona that was 
recognizable, and they wouldn’t need millions in campaign funding to 
get elected.  That hasn’t panned out yet.  We are in the early stages of 
the project, and we have mixed results.  In terms of the systemic process, 
the Oaks are trying to create new standards for candidates.  For instance, 
we had an interesting demonstration outside the office of the California 
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Assembly Speaker, Bob Hertzberg.  We called him “Bailout Bob” for 
some actions he took to bail out the utility industry.  Such actions do 
slow down bad legislation because Hertzberg had some higher 
ambitions.  I think it has an effect. 
Just in terms of the initiative process, for instance, we are going to the 
legislature this year to try to get a new standard for initiative politics.  
There is a problem with the initiative process being corrupted by 
corporations who put initiatives on themselves under the guise of 
campaign committees that sound like they are citizen committees.  Also, 
we wanted to create a new standard, called the “Volunteer Qualified 
Initiative.”  This VQI would be as follows: if an initiative qualifies on a 
volunteer basis, it gets special ballot designation on anything the 
Secretary of State puts out, and it also could qualify for special state 
money.  In California, we’re talking about turning in about 700,000 
volunteer qualified signatures, so that is an awful lot—more than seven 
times what we did with our six Oaks local initiatives.  But that is a very 
high standard.  And the Oaks are trying to create this next level in terms 
of candidates and initiatives.  So I think it is like raising the bar by 
example in many ways. 
Playing in the current game, I don’t think we have a chance.  I think if 
we change the rules of the game we have a chance.  But changing the 
rules is going to be more by new models that are volunteer oriented in 
action and getting new types of candidates out there.  It is very difficult.  
We faced one legal challenge to our initiative, in Vista, where the court 
of appeal reversed an adverse preliminary injunction from the trial court, 
but it is not clear that this is going to be the end of it.  So we do not 
know what is going to happen in the end. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
How many states have the initiative process?  Do you know? 
JAMIE COURT:  
That is a good question. 
WENDY WENDLANDT:  
About twenty-four, I think.  But that kind of mixes in referendum 
states, which are not always as good because that is strictly by way of 
referral from the legislature to the ballot. 
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MATTHEW MYERS:  
And how significant is that process, Wendy, in holding legislatures 
accountable? 
WENDY WENDLANDT:  
I think it is incredibly important, judging from our PIRG experience in 
the states where we have the initiative process.  It is no coincidence that 
those states tend to be more public interest oriented states.  In those 
states where we have the initiative process, we get better legislation out 
of the legislature, in addition to the passage of laws through the initiative 
process. 
JAMIE COURT:  
Let me also say that it helps hold candidates to campaign pledges, 
because we had an initiative in 1996 on HMO reform.19  It was the first 
HMO reform initiative in the nation to deal with the Patients’ Bill of 
Rights.  It pioneered that slogan: “Doctors, not bureaucrats, should be 
practicing medicine.”  What that did as a test run was raise the issue in 
California.  In 1999 Governor Davis signed legislation that was almost 
identical to that initiative.20  The initiative started in 1996 to raise some 
issues.  It failed because people didn’t understand the HMO concept; it 
went to the legislature for a couple of years where Governor Wilson 
vetoed bill after bill.  But it helped to create a public consciousness.  By 
the time Governor Davis took office, there was this whole culture 
supporting that proposal, and he signed it relatively quickly after taking 
office.  He really didn’t have a choice—it had its own momentum.  So 
there is a way to use the initiative process to publicly raise issues that 
then become very important for candidates.  I think it has been very 
powerful. 
One example of such populist impact is in proposition 13,21 which is 
an awful initiative.  It limits the tax base and creates radical disparities in 
the tax burden between property owners—favoring older, wealthier 
property owners.  Many people may know about it, but it brought into 
 
 19. CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET, PRIMARY ELECTION 52–57 (1996), available 
at http://holmes.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1996g.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2003). 
 20. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124960  (West Supp. 2003). 
 21. CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET, PRIMARY ELECTION 56–60 (1978), available 
at http://holmes.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1978p.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).  
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town a whole era of politicians on the other side of the equation—who 
were not particularly good for California.  They rode in on the coattails 
of the initiative.  Similarly, proposition 103,22 which our Foundation’s 
president authored, was an insurance reform initiative in 1988.  It 
brought in a lot of people to Sacramento who were pledged to hold the 
insurance industry accountable.  So the coattails of these initiatives 
really do affect candidates. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
How ready is the public interest community to effectively use the 
initiative process?  It involves skills, tactics, and numbers that are 
different than what we are used to using. 
JAMIE COURT:  
Yes, I think it is like engaging in political warfare.  The public interest 
community is not used to engaging in warfare on that scale.  It is used to 
engaging on issues, but not in challenging the system.  I think that there 
are some things that will help it in the coming years.  One factor that 
could break this whole issue open is electronic signatures.  One of the 
things the corporations did for us in Washington, D.C., was to pass a 
new Electronic Signature Act, so they are as valid as a live signature.  
Well, apparently many people think that will apply to signing an 
initiative.  So this will help all of your groups that have a lot of e-mail 
activists who will not show up to a meeting or gather a signature, but 
will respond to an e-mail.  If they register their signature electronically 
and there is a very good idea for an initiative, that also can qualify for all 
volunteer qualified initiatives.  But we are probably going to have to 
stop changes in the law designed to stop that opportunity because it is 
too good a deal. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
That is where the filibuster comes in handy. 
JAMIE COURT:  
To qualify an initiative in the absence of a volunteer base, at one 
dollar per signature, would cost $700,000.  Even once on the ballot, it is 
very easy to get a “no” vote on an initiative—people like to vote “no” 
because they feel deceived by the process.  So until we have higher 
standards to sort out these initiatives, like the Good Housekeeping Seal 
 
 22. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION 98–101, 140–44 (1988), 
available at http://holmes.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1988g.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 
2003).  
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of Approval or the “Volunteer Qualified Initiative,” it is difficult for 
people to sort through them.  In California it must be a very simple 
initiative written in a few sentences that people can read, and it must 
have a very good ballot summary—so we have to have a good attorney 
general to give it a good ballot summary.  All the gods have to be 
aligned.  It is very difficult to get out a message about an initiative that is 
not simple or something people readily understand.  I think it clearly can 
be done on issues that are simple.  Electricity, for example, is an issue 
where you would not need a lot of money.  The message is already there, 
and if certain types of people support an initiative on the ballot, the 
message will be disseminated. 
But without issues that are not in the forefront, I think it is very 
difficult for the public interest community to get out those messages.  I 
think one of the things we could talk about is building capacity to get 
messages out.  That is something that our group has really focused on: 
HMOs, electricity, real populist issues.  But other groups in the public 
interest community do not focus enough on shaping messages, and using 
very strong messages, as a way of changing politics.  We should be 
creating the message and then following it with legislation, rather than 
starting with the legislation to create a message that may never get big 
enough in that forum to pass legislation. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
You talked about the situation where an industry flooded the 
legislature with phone calls from the 800 number, and you said that we 
do not have the resources to do that.  Then, when you started talking 
about the initiative, you talked about what we had to learn how to do as a 
movement.  And, I’m struck that the public interest community is often 
dependent on far too few people and traditional skills in doing what we 
do.  We have not been as creative or quick as the corporate community 
in using the tools out there.  There are now enormous low cost 
opportunities to get our message out using the Internet, using electronic 
communications.  And those 800 numbers—they are a lot cheaper today 
than they used to be.  We need to begin exploring ways to do those 
things, because we can do the same things.  Our organization has shut 
down the phone system in three separate state legislatures with quick 
campaigns because our message is, in fact, a more powerful one, and we 
do have more constituents out there.  We have that funny thing on our 
side; it’s actually the truth. 
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Our organization is using a combination of radio advertising and 
phone banking that has inexpensively changed the dynamic in a number 
of legislatures fairly quickly.  The real lesson that we still come back to 
is: what are the guts of the legislative process?  Is it that people have to 
go home and face a constituency?  We have not done a very good job at 
making them think their constituency is not only supportive of us 
(because we all know how to do polling), but cares enough about what 
we are doing to be watching, active, and ultimately, of course, to do the 
critical thing—to act at the voting booth.  I think we spend far too little 
time talking about strategies to do those things better. Unless we do that, 
we can have all the rules we want, but if a member can vote ultimately 
the way they want to vote, then it is meaningless. 
WENDY WENDLANDT:  
Right.  We spend much more of our time on the outside game than on 
those inside rules.  I point them out because they are a big problem.  But 
it boils down to capacity, so you must have the resources.  These 800 
numbers, they cost money.  We have to be able to do it, so we need to 
have capacity.  And it is training and teaching the people the skills that it 
takes to do this work effectively, so that we are not expending energy 
without getting good product.  We also need to pay attention to 
targeting.  In terms of a legislative campaign, we are not going to 
convince the entire legislature, so we really have to figure out who the 
targets are early on in a legislative campaign.  Who are the people with 
us?  Who are the people opposed?  Who are the people in the middle?  
Then how are we going to move the people in the middle?  It may be a 
field campaign, because we have the resources to do it, or there are more 
creative options for somebody who is particularly intransigent.  We have 
done all kinds of crazy things: fish dogging candidates—sending giant 
fish into their districts on clean water battles.  We did that in a campaign 
to pass a bill in the California Legislature; we chose five districts and we 
just followed those candidates everywhere with those fish.  Then, in the 
legislature we lobbied the larger set of people.  But that kind of thinking 
about strategy and resources, I don’t think it is something we are 
particularly facile at doing. 
CHARLES HALPERN:  
Let me suggest that we, as lawyers, are not very facile at these things.  
We are here under the auspices of a law school talking about public 
interest law, not the public interest.  I think this discussion underlines for 
me how far the public interest law movement has come and how modest 
we lawyers have to be in assessing what our contribution is within this 
larger movement.  I think, Jamie, your comments about the work on the 
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outside suggest there is a very important role for lawyers in seeing 
opportunities and drafting documents.  But public interest lawyers have 
to collaborate in a much larger process, in a movement toward democratic 
reform, which has both a legislative and a popular dimension.  
The early successes of public interest law were almost exclusively in 
the courts, and the skills of lawyers were obviously relevant.  One reason 
for those early successes was the element of surprise.  The lawyers for 
the big corporations did not expect to have environmental advocates 
making sophisticated arguments under NEPA (the National Environmental 
Policy Act)23 when it was first passed.  But when we start talking about 
our participation in the democratic renewal movement, then we have to 
think more specifically about how we, as lawyers, contribute.  In some 
ways we are less capable at the jobs of community organizing than 
people without a law degree.  It is, to some extent, a handicap. 
The other thing I want to highlight is the fact that we have been 
talking about the public interest law community as if we knew what that 
meant.  I want to suggest that there is at least some strong evidence that 
no public interest law community now exists.  Bob Fellmeth and I were 
talking earlier about other gatherings similar to this one to bring together 
the public interest law community, and he could not think of any.  And I 
could remember only the one that we ran at the Center for Law and 
Social Policy in 1971.  So that is a thirty-year hiatus since this 
community has come together.  And without going into too much 
history, in 1971 it was a very contentious gathering.  I am sure this 
gathering is going to have a smoother end than that one did.  There, you 
had welfare rights advocates, such as George Wiley, simply blowing up 
at environmental advocates.  While our contention was that there was a 
public interest law community, many of the discussants did not see it 
that way. 
So I think we have to be more self-conscious about this, and, as we 
think about how to move forward, we should be thinking about how to 
build a sense of community among public interest lawyers.  Few people 
here, except when they come to a conference like this, identify 
themselves as public interest lawyers.  Most of us identify ourselves as 
environmental lawyers, health lawyers, lawyers for the poor, lawyers for 
children, or lawyers for the elderly.  If we could build some consciousness 
 
 23. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-90, 83 Stat. 852 
(codified as amended in scattered section of 42 U.S.C.). 
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of a public interest law community and of those institutions which bring 
the public interest law community together, it would be a great 
achievement. 
One example of such an institution today is the Alliance for Justice, in 
Washington, D.C.  It is one of the few places where, on an ongoing 
basis, these diverse communities of the public interest law movement 
come together and work on common matters.  And—surprise—there is 
no shortage of matters of common interest that unify everybody.  Some 
of you read today that the Bush Administration is altering the process by 
which the federal judges are selected, in a way which will close out the 
American Bar Association and leave the Administration freer to appoint 
real conservative ideologues to the federal bench.  This is an issue in 
which everyone who is in the public interest law movement has a stake.  
We should be thinking about how we can identify those kinds of issues.  
Campaign finance reform is another one.  We all have a stake in that 
issue.  We should be identifying those things and thinking about how we 
work together on those matters of common interest. 
What if, for example, a large and well-funded environmental organization 
designated one person on their staff to work on issues of common 
concern and other organizations followed the same route?  We might be 
able to build a critical mass for a sense of a public interest law 
community that actually acts on behalf of shared interest. 
JAMIE COURT:  
Let me make a case for communication, too.  When we passed this 
Oaks campaign financing conflict of interest initiative in Pasadena, we 
then had to defend it in court.  Pasadena went to join another city in court, 
so we turned to a center that was a panelist earlier for legal help.  It turned 
out they could not help us because they were already consulting with the 
Mayor of the city of Pasadena.  That said to the activists in the community 
that this public interest lawyer was not on the side of the community’s 
interest in campaign finance reform.  So I think one of the things that 
needs to be done is to create some communication about where the outside 
efforts will merge with the inside efforts and with the interests of the 
public interest community at large, because it was really disheartening to 
have that happen.  We had to spend $10,000 to actually have a lawyer 
defend us.  So it is important, it is really important, that as everybody 
walks away from this conference, people make an effort to communicate 
about what is going on, about whatever vital issues are identified here as a 
common cause, and it is rather easy to do that electronically.  I don’t know 
if anyone has set up a list server for the public interest community, but it 
might be a wonderful byproduct of this conference. 
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GENE KIMMELMAN:  
Beyond communications, I think Charlie is talking about something 
more fundamental here that is very important.  There are so many issues 
that are invisible to us with our own blinders on; Charlie mentioned a 
few.  Here is a stray one: everyone is talking about using the Internet 
electronically to communicate with everyone else and about how it has 
been a wonderful, open system.  Everyone uses a telephone wire, which 
the telephone company cannot control.  But the cable companies, which 
have a fatter wire that can offer television service with their Internet 
services, are increasingly dominating the new high speed Internet.  After 
numerous regulatory legal efforts before Congress, and through merger 
review, we have been unsuccessful at requiring it to be opened.  A cable 
company can have its own company that dominates its high speed pipe 
with no obligations to the public, leaving no choice and no rate 
regulation.  Now, it is a telecommunications issue, it is a media issue, 
but it is an issue that could affect everyone’s ability to use these new 
technologies for public participation, for democratic action.  We need to 
put information out about what this means.  We need more involvement 
in these fundamental infrastructure issues.  They are, I think, almost 
comparable to campaign financing. 
WENDY WENDLANDT:  
I want to add one other thing to Charlie’s comments.  I know from my 
experience from working with PIRG and doing a lot of recruitment at 
law schools that looking for graduating third-year law students who want 
to come and do public interest work is difficult.  By and large, they do 
not understand public interest advocacy.  Ralph Nader addressed one of 
the questions, discriminatory justice.  My experience with graduating 
law students is that legal services is their vision of what being a public 
interest lawyer is all about. 
And I fear that if we build a network of public service attorneys, we 
will quickly return to the screaming and shouting between the welfare 
people and the environmental people.  There is a fundamental lack of 
understanding about what I always refer to as “Nader public interest 
advocacy.”  There are not a lot of graduating law students who think 
they are going to protect consumers’ rights to have access to cable.  It is 
not taught at law school.  They do not understand it.  They do not 
understand why an attorney would do that.  Attorneys litigate, attorneys 
work for law firms, attorneys don’t lobby in the legislature.  So I feel 
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like there is a gulf in the definition of a public interest attorney, and our 
wing of the public interest movement is losing.  The National Association 
of Public Interest Law (NAPIL) was set up with the very purpose of 
doing this, of introducing law students to the idea of public interest 
advocacy and getting them into it.  The legal services wing of the public 
interest movement has largely overtaken it.  I am not an attorney, so this 
is more my layperson activist’s view of what the law community thinks 
of itself. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
I think your comments complement what Charlie said.  Part of the 
problem is not just that the public interest community does not 
communicate, but that we have not advanced the public interest law 
community.  That is in part because people coming out of law school 
only think of public interest lawyers as doing litigation.  Yet, as the 
world has moved, public interest law is much, much more than litigation.  
The sort of legislative skills in which many of us are engaged are a very 
a critical component.  Lawyers may not be great organizers, but they are 
absolutely critical skilled professionals as part of the overall team.  We 
are not doing enough to help the young lawyers (1) have an opportunity 
for growth in that career arena, (2) see its impact and its value, and (3) 
see why it requires the most skilled among us. 
One of the things that we all need to be doing better is recruiting the 
best and the brightest by making our work as attractive as it was to us 
when we were mentored by a number of the people on this panel some 
years ago and encouraged to go into these fields.  We are not doing 
enough of that because we are not demonstrating how that track is 
meaningful, how it does affect public policy—putting real live faces on 
the results.  One of the things that I say to a lot of groups is that 
campaign finance reform is the perfect example.  We are never going to 
sell it on esoteric principles of democracy, because that may interest 
every single person in this room, but it is not going to energize a whole 
host of people out there.  Unless we make those issues real, in terms of 
the daily life of people, we are not going to energize the broad numbers 
necessary. 
JAMIE COURT:  
I think that is important when we teach young lawyers or when we go 
back to law school to teach public interest law—to teach politics, 
political power, and public opinion.  Because, you are absolutely right, if 
we look at what the Supreme Court did recently, it basically said the 
right to commerce is more important than the Seventh Amendment right 
to trial, that workers can be shoved into binding arbitration contracts—a 
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very important principle.24  The reason there has been such an erosion of 
rights and why binding arbitration is taking over more and more is 
because the public does not understand what it is losing, does not 
understand that the Seventh Amendment right to trial is part of the 
Constitution.  There is no one getting that message out.  It seems to me 
that public interest lawyers really need to learn to communicate 
politically in a way that is effective.  I think the people on this panel 
have learned that over twenty or twenty-five years of experience, and it 
is something that somehow has to get back into the law schools. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
There is an important lesson in skill development.  We go to law 
school, and we do not learn to litigate; God knows what we learn in law 
school.  But at some point early on, we theoretically learn to litigate.  
But those of us who work in the public arena do not really have much of 
the very same training.  How to fashion a message to influence a judge is 
very different than how to fashion message to energize a populace—or 
to gain credibility with the media, or even to get in the media. 
Ralph Nader said this at his Keynote Address; it is now much more 
difficult to get the media to cover these sorts of issues.  I think many 
fewer people watch the news.  Many of us do not have a lot of trouble 
getting to the media, but what we are not skilled enough at is mass 
communication.  How do we synthesize our message so it energizes, 
how do we synthesize our message so the media will cover us?  They 
will only give us twenty-five seconds in a sound bite, and we better 
make sure that what we say makes sense in those twenty-five seconds.  
If we are going to influence the legislative process (which brings me to 
my transition in the little time we have left to talk about this), can we do 
this work without a broader examination of the electoral process itself 
and who is involved and who is not involved?  And that goes beyond 
campaign finance reform.  Charlie, do you want to address that? 
CHARLES HALPERN:  
Yes, I think that is really where much of our discussion and the 
discussion of the panel before us leads.  These discussions lead in the 
direction of democratic reform.  I want to direct your attention to an 
 
 24. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Saint Clair Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
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article in the materials by Miles Rapoport25 about the democratic renewal 
movement, which he thinks has the potential now in the wake of the 
2000 election debacle that it never has had before.  He talks about some of 
the possibilities of proportional representation or instant runoff voting. 
CHARLES HALPERN:  
There is an opportunity here and it seems to me that that is the direction 
we ought to be going.  Miles Rapoport is known to some of you.  He was an 
organizer in the Northeast and has recently headed a new organization 
called Dēmos, a Network of Ideas and Action, an institution which will 
be looking at issues of concern to progressives and to the public interest 
law community and which will think about where we want to head ten or 
fifteen years from now.  It is not going to be dealing with the immediate 
legislative challenges.  They are trying to create a vision of where we are 
heading with the idea. 
Many of us are living with some version of a “Great Society” or “New 
Deal” picture of what the future looks like, which is quite antiquated.  
Some of the values that underlie that vision are ones that still animate us.  
But they do not take into account globalization and its challenges, they 
do not take into account technology, its challenges, and the opportunities 
it creates.  So as someone said earlier, we need some institutions like the 
conservative think tanks that started at this task in 1970.  We hope that 
Dēmos is going to be such an organization.  Ideally, we will, as they 
have, become a network of such organizations.  But at present we do not 
have very much.  There is a brief write up of Dēmos in the materials, 
and the web site is www.demos-usa.org.  It is worth having a look, 
because it addresses some of the longer term questions, among them 
democratic renewal, that I think our analysis leads toward. 
GENE KIMMELMAN:  
If I could jump in, I think that Charlie is absolutely right.  But I think 
at the same time we are missing something about where we are right 
now and an immediate step that we need to take.  You mentioned the last 
panel and the importance of kicking off electoral reform and campaign 
finance, but at that panel it almost splintered at the end as to exactly 
what that would be.  Why was that the case?  Because the reality of the 
political process tries to splinter us with amendments—to propose 
changes to a positive agenda that potentially destroy our own initiatives.  
It is not just countering that, which is obviously critical, but what is also 
missing here is the problem of the welfare advocates versus the 
environmentalists.  I think we need to tackle that head on. 
 
 25. See Rapoport, supra note 11, at 41. 
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Having experienced twenty to thirty years of the variety of public 
interest advocacy that we have been talking about, we have some 
understanding of the inherent conflicts between a grassroots approach, 
an initiative approach, a legislative lobbying approach, and a legal 
strategy in court or regulatory approach.  Yet we constantly keep coming 
back to the same conflicts: are we not reaching high enough, far enough?  
Are we not idealistic enough?  Are we cutting a bad deal?  Are we 
giving away too much?  We can never make those issues go away; I 
think we need a more structured discussion in our community of how we 
approach those issues maturely and intelligently to avoid being 
splintered.  How do we possibly differ in what our roles are as a grassroots 
person, or as someone who focuses on initiatives, or someone who 
lobbies the legislature, and agree to maturely disagree—because at 
different junctures we need to accomplish some incremental steps while 
trying to further the larger message.  One thing I have learned above all 
in the lobbying process is that when we win, as seldom as it is, we often 
lose that in two, three, or four years.  It is vulnerable if it is not 
sustainable with the grassroots movement or if there is some change in 
climate or change in events.  Conversely, sometimes when we lose, we 
come back stronger two, three, or four years later.  We need to build that 
incremental, sustained effort into our approach.  Unless we can maturely 
engage in such continuing strategies, and build the media part onto it and 
a litigation strategy with it, we are going to have a difficult time—even 
with a long term vision. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
 You have raised a very difficult problem.  The very nature of the 
people we attract are zealous idealists.  To put them in the legislative 
process and ask them to deal with reality and compromise is a 
prescription for Maalox.  But one of the challenges is to put that mix of 
people together to reach the best possible results.  On every issue, we 
absolutely need the people who will not compromise, who will not bend 
a single inch, who will be the clarion call for purity—because that is the 
only way we know what the ultimate vision is.  But somehow we also 
have to train the cadre of people who are capable of going in and helping 
us take those step-by-step changes that will get us there.  Otherwise, we 
will do as we heard the last panel talk about—reach the precipice of 
change only to implode on ourselves and not get there. 
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GENE KIMMELMAN:  
But, my point is, not only do we need both—we need to have both in 
the same room talking to each other about how and why both are 
significant.  It virtually needs to be a curriculum within the public 
interest community, a course.  It is something that we need everyone to 
sit down and do, to figure out what is meaningful incremental change 
and what is detrimental incremental change.  There will be no one 
measurement, obviously.  It will be no more scientific than political 
science itself, but I think it is an extremely important discussion to have.  
We always have it anecdotally or in a particular situation.  We never do 
it with rigor in our community, and I think until we do that and have 
some feeling of respect for the way people approach it, we are going to 
have a difficult time getting to some of the bigger goals. 
JAMIE COURT:  
We just did that in California, putting together the consumer advocates, 
labor advocates, environmentalists—a lot of people with different 
interests.  We had some very long meetings about how we could work 
together more effectively to fight our enemies, who seem always to be 
on the same page.  Rather than simply looking at how we can help each 
other in our current causes, we decided to take a look at a new front 
legislatively—to choose issues that would legislatively hurt our common 
enemies.  I think it is vital in Washington and in states where there are 
consumer groups, labor groups, and environmentalists, that those 
conversations have to occur.  Because we are not big coalition builders, 
but the value of getting together in the way that these industries have, 
can be substantial.  Some of the messages from such combinations are 
really extraordinary.  Look, for instance, at “litigation explosion” and the 
“frivolous lawsuit” allegations from the insurance and business PAC 
advertising—these words have become part of our culture because every 
industry in America uses them and supports them and finances them, and 
we do not have a comparable joint effort on our side.  So I can just say 
from our experience in California that it looks like something really 
positive to do. 
WENDY WENDLANDT:  
Some of the division comes from the distinction between lawyers who 
litigate, lawyers who are involved in writing legislation, and the 
nonlawyer advocates who are writing legislation—and who are relying 
on other people.  One way to approach it in a training sense would be to 
bring people together issue by issue—bring litigators together with 
lobbyists and try to train each other on a substantive target.  It is cross 
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training in a way because, after doing this work for twenty years and 
being involved in litigation, we come to understand that those things are 
related.  But I think when we first start, that is not an obvious point.  
Litigators do not realize that the people are up there at the statehouse 
working, writing that legislation, and we could possibly fix it there more 
effectively.  We could have written the law in a different way in the first 
place.  Again, cross fertilization training would be helpful. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
We have sort of rambled; this may be the most difficult session to 
organize.  The obvious areas of discussion, the rules of the legislature, 
those are the sorts of things that we as lawyers are comfortable talking 
about.  How do we have a more open process?  How do we eliminate 
institutional bias?  Those are some things we did not spend much time 
talking about, and I suggest that they are absolutely essential. 
At a second level, we have talked about a host of skills that are not 
those traditionally taught to public interest lawyers: how to reach out and 
build a mass movement, how to communicate with people, and how to 
work the electoral process in an effective way. 
And the third area relates to the electoral process itself.  Unless the 
process is more open and participatory, the reality is that we could do all 
of our jobs perfectly, and the end product still is not going to be what we 
think it ought to be, because legislators will not fear going home to their 
constituents,  and campaign money will still override the process. 
So we are going to have to break down each of those pieces and 
recognize that all three are absolutely critical if we are going to move 
forward.  David? 
DAVID VLADECK:  
A law school is hosting us; many of the panelists are lawyers.  I was 
reminded by one of the questions that many of the law schools are now 
beginning to have courses on legislative lawyering.  CUNY has externships 
placing law students in lobbying activities to learn first hand.  This poses 
two separate questions.  To what extent can these lobbying skills be properly 
taught in law schools?  And what is the proper role of the lawyer in the 
legislative process?  Our organization at one point quite dogmatically 
insisted that our lobbyists be lawyers.  We have not come completely 
full circle, but we have come ninety percent around.  And I think it 
would be very interesting to get the panelists’ views on these questions. 
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CHARLES HALPERN:  
First, I want to be clear about something that we have all talked about: 
when we are talking about legislation, public interest lawyers are 
involved in a political process.  This is something that we have not 
always been straight about with our funders or ourselves.  Now going 
back to my life as an ex-funder, I am aware that many foundations are 
antsy about advocacy and terrified about lobbying.  Many sophisticated 
foundation executives think that no foundation dollars can be used for 
lobbying, which, as you all know, is completely erroneous. 
So I think part of our job as educators is to help educate funders and 
also nonprofits.  There are many nonprofits that think they cannot lobby.  
They are not likely to be represented here, but they need to understand 
that they can elect under § 501(h)26 and have quite a safe harbor for their 
lobbying activities.  So I think we should be playing that role. 
As for the role of lawyers, I am not hopeful about training lawyers.  
As a former legal educator, training lawyers to craft punchy messages 
that really resonate with the voters is problematical.  There is too much 
in our training and background handicapping that skill.  I think some 
things can be taught, but teaching those skills to lawyers is very difficult, 
with some exceptions. 
What seems to me to be missing is something that the conservatives 
have done so brilliantly, through an organization that they call the 
Federalist Society.  It helps, from their point of view, to bring together 
law professors, activists, and law students; it becomes the recruiting 
system, and it provides roles for different people.  For the real zealous 
idealists, there is a role for them; for the people who are just vaguely 
interested in supporting this kind of work, it does it for them.  We have 
nothing comparable to that.  So as we get clearer about what lawyers can 
learn and should learn to be effective public interest lawyers, it would be 
well for us to put together some sort of organization in which we all 
interact, including not only public interest lawyers but also law 
professors. 
I had an odd experience when I was in residence at NYU Law School 
a couple of months ago.  We were getting involved with the estate tax 
fight—another issue in which all of us have a real stake.  The estate tax, 
as you know, is paid by less than two percent of all Americans.  Yet, 
partly because it was renamed the death tax by its opponents, the idea of 
repealing the estate tax has developed a tremendous purchase.  I walked 
down the part of the law school corridor where all the tax professors 
have their offices, and I had a conversation out in the corridor with one 
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of them, a former IRS commissioner.  He thought it was a disaster to 
have this thing repealed, but he had in no way communicated this to 
anybody.  People started coming out of their offices, and they also were 
opposed to the repeal of the estate tax.  One professor had just finished a 
law review article, which was being edited for the New York University 
Law Review, about how important the estate tax is in the overall 
structure of our tax system.  So what I was able to do was to call up Gary 
Bass and get these guys, and they were all guys, plugged into this effort 
to oppose the repeal of the estate tax.  There has been a sea of change in 
attitude on the repeal of the estate tax in the last four weeks, partly 
triggered by the very brilliant piece of public interest advocacy headed 
by Warren Buffet and Bill Gates, Sr., of all people, which is a reminder 
of the kind of ingenuity that we have to exercise.  The point is to bring 
the professors into some kind of setting with people who have similar 
concerns.  It is an interesting task in which we public interest lawyers 
might take a lead. 
GENE KIMMELMAN:  
I just wanted to comment on David’s question.  I think a course may 
be nice, but doing this kind of public interest advocacy requires an 
apprenticeship, a fellowship, it requires on-the-job training.  It is 
difficult to make the abstract issues involved in rules meaningful until 
you are actually in a legislative process and feel and experience it.  So I 
think that is critical.  I would like to get a list of people who would sign 
up for such a course to know who to target for a fellowship. 
I am one of the people who has probably come full circle on the 
question of lawyers and lobbying, because I started out feeling strongly 
that lobbyists should be attorneys.  I do not feel that way now.  I think 
the single criterion is exceptional analytical ability.  Those who are 
really sharp can figure out what the constitutional issues are, why 
legislative language matters, and where it fits in with regulatory matters.  
Law school is not necessary for that; a lot of people who go to law 
school don’t do that. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
Can I just add one thing?  In one place I disagree with Charlie.  I think 
all lawyers would benefit from learning how to speak in a way that 
would influence legislators, because it is the sort of English that we 
ought to be using in the courtroom as well. 
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DAVID VLADECK:  
It will take a ten-page disclaimer before you open your mouth.  I 
would point to the energy emergency here.  The question in the materials 
notes that it seems to take a crisis to provoke a legislative response these 
days.  I think the question really has two parts: is that observation 
correct?  And, if so, what does that say about our legislative process? 
GENE KIMMELMAN:  
I think it is correct.  I was sitting there listening to Ralph Nader and 
thinking about healthcare.  The majority of the American people want 
something for the uninsured, for prescription drugs, for managed-care 
consumer protection, and for privacy protection.  You can go through a 
whole list where there is clear majority support.  Why isn’t it happening?  
Well, there are a lot of reasons, but one is the lack of intensity.  So a 
crisis has that element of intensity.  Yet, a crisis isn’t even necessarily 
enough, because we will end up with some patchwork fix.  Take 
energy—to the extent Congress has finally awakened and thinks there is 
a federal problem, it will be “just get me through this summer without 
brownouts.”  I think that is where we are. 
My reaction to what Ralph said was that, in addition to where he was 
going with new institutions, we can take crises and figure out how to 
mobilize people while they are so focused.  Electricity is an example.  It 
is our campaign finance system that gave us these laws.  It is a travesty 
involving corporate power and avoidance of responsibility.  It gives us 
an opportunity to talk about the impossibility of deregulation in certain 
areas and the fundamental problems with deregulation.  It does not just 
have to be electricity; fly on an airplane or look at a cable television bill.  
There are broader issues that can immediately be raised.  We should try 
to build something out of it so we can ask: “what is the next chapter 
reachable through this challenge?” 
WENDY WENDLANDT:  
That is true.  Crises can be an opportunity for us; it is a terrible 
opportunity, but it provides an opening—it is on the public agenda.  The 
legislature is actually poised to act.  They feel like they have to do 
something—not always good, but at least something.  But I think it is a 
mistake to get into the mindset that a crisis is the only way we can get 
reform.  I think concerted campaigns by public interest groups with 
institutional support can work.  The point of institutions is to have an 
entity to continue working day after day.  It should not just mobilize in 
case of a crisis.  I know Congress is a whole different beast on this score, 
but with concerted effort and focus at the state level, you can pass 
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legislation.  We have all kinds of examples.  It has become more 
difficult to do this, but taking a piece of legislation and working it 
through the process—from getting it written, the right sponsors, the right 
committee, the right testimony, the right endorsers, the whole 
campaign—it can be done.  We, as the public interest community, can 
set the agenda.  But it requires us to have more political power than we 
have now to do it on a wide range of issues. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
The nature of the political process is such that the hard reforms against 
the special interests are much more difficult without a crisis.  There is no 
question about that.  It is also true that a crisis is almost always not 
enough if we are not poised to take advantage of it.  The energy crisis in 
California becomes real if we put a face on it.  Think of all the senior 
citizens on fixed incomes who have been crushed by the energy crisis.  
They are the face of that crisis.  If they were the face of the campaign to 
do something about it, there would be a different result.  It is not just an 
esoteric debate about energy and an occasional brownout. 
We have seen occasions where we have missed the crisis opportunity, 
for example, gun control in Columbine.  If we are not poised to figure 
out where we want to go and how to do it, we can have a massive crisis 
and not be ready to use it for the public good.  What is happening now 
with the shootings in schools and the lack of response is appalling.  But I 
think Wendy also makes an important point: we cannot let ourselves off 
the hook.  We cannot wait for a crisis in order to be able to move.  We 
need to figure out strategies to develop the support.  Campaign finance 
reform is being debated on the floor of the Senate today, not because 
there was a crisis, but because there was a sustained strategy to do it.  
Anybody who has done this work realizes that we can mobilize that 
broad public support with clever messages and by organizing to build 
intensity, not in all fifty states, but in targeted places.  So we cannot let 
ourselves off the hook by waiting for a crisis. 
JAMIE COURT:  
There is nothing anybody in this room is working on that they do not 
think is a crisis.  The issue is: how do you make everyone else understand 
that it is a crisis?  There was a crisis with HMOs long before anyone saw 
a Patients’ Bill of Rights.  We ran a campaign where, for five months, we 
faxed a different picture and story of an HMO victim who did not have a 
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remedy.  We sent it to Congress every day, every morning.  They got it.  
The repetition educates the community.  I think that one of the problems 
is a body of knowledge we really have in our day-to-day work.  I do not 
think that we really understand that the public doesn’t receive it.  I do 
not think that we understand the degree to which they don’t receive it. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
That is why that picture that you were sending to the legislature—if 
you’d been sending it to the local newspaper and citizens’ groups—the 
communications go both ways.  You probably did, I’m sure. 
JAMIE COURT:  
 We did.  We mostly faxed it to the media folks, and they picked up 
some of these stories, and that is how it got a face.  In fact, when they 
openly debated HMO reform in Congress, a lot of those pictures were 
blown up on the floor, and those stories were told.  It becomes 
something that no one can vote against. 
I will give you an example of the difference between having a crisis 
and not.  In 1998 proposition 9 would have stopped a lot of the 
deregulation bills.27  That was the energy initiative our group sponsored; 
we got a very low percentage of the vote.  If there were an initiative on 
the ballot tomorrow, it would pass.  So the degree to which we harness 
an existing crisis is another issue.  When they get to that level of 
visibility there’s a lot of possibility. 
DAVID VLADECK:  
Jamie’s last point is the segue into the next question.  Accepting the 
premise that there is a growing concentration in the media, how much 
more difficult does that make your job?  You need to convince an editor 
that there is a story here.  If there are only two or three networks and 
there are only six or seven national newspapers, does it make it that 
much more difficult for your message to get across? 
GENE KIMMELMAN:  
I think that is where we are going and on two fundamental levels.  
First, it is not just the concentration of the media, but their ancillary 
connections.  Let’s take the name of a company: AOL-Time Warner.  
You think of all of the holdings—a vast web ranging from Internet to 
programming to cable properties, on through to the software world.  
Now, beyond the normal problem of the media just wanting to do what 
 
 27. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION 40–43 (1998), available 
at http://holmes.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1998g.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2003). 
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is easy, how much interference with editorial control do these conflicts 
portend?  After fitting their model for the eight-second sound bite, there 
is a new barrier: how much will they want to cover issues involving their 
own company?  I think journalists themselves worry about this.  Add to 
this layer that the media still relies dramatically on advertising revenue.  
What leverage do those advertisers have beyond the immediate 
corporate interest of that media company itself?  Where does the media 
firm have its investments?  These are the people who bankroll a lot of 
what they put out there.  What if they start wanting to pull back? 
If there are more companies with different strategies, with different 
corporate bases, with a different view of what their mission is in the 
media, I think invariably we are going to do better.  So I think at the rate 
we are going with the current political process and with the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals recently overturning some cable ownership limits,28 a 
few more major mergers will lead us to such a tight oligopoly that it will 
be very dependent on those few owners and their attitudes. 
JAMIE COURT:  
We do not really have a problem selling stories, but the problem is 
that there are not that many stories that can be sold.  The rules of 
engagement are so narrow, and there are many issues that cannot be 
furthered in the media and that are left out. 
Has anyone watched CNN lately since the merger?  You will see now 
that the center of the Morning Show is the Internet.  It’s a character.  
They have a big screen up, and they go to the Internet.  This is a 
company now owned by AOL, and they are encouraging Internet use.  
So half the stories on the Morning Show now are about the Internet.  We 
have to play by those rules; so it is definitely a problem in terms of the 
breadth of the debate and what issues can be raised. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
David, let me just say that this reality is our challenge.  We should be 
talking about how we are going to communicate with large numbers of 
people given the reality of media concentration and bias, even while we 
worry about what to do about that reality.  Therefore, we need to be 
developing improved strategies to use the Internet and other grassroots 
 
 28. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 240 F.3d 1126 
(D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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mechanisms.  If, in fact, AOL-Time Warner decides they do not want to 
cover our issue or they do not want to cover it when we want them to 
cover it, we still have built up a network and a means of communication 
that are not as dependent on them as we have traditionally been.  I think 
we can do that, but we need to be creative.  Again, not another skill they 
teach in law school. 
DAVID VLADECK:  
I want to switch gears for a moment.  There is a question from a law 
student who is prompted by something that Wendy said about the way 
that law students view public interest opportunities.  To make a very 
long question short—apart from a few fellowships, how does one break 
into public interest law, particularly public interest law that has a 
legislative component to it?  Wendy, why don’t you take the first crack 
at this? 
WENDY WENDLANDT:  
I spend time recruiting graduating law students to come do work for 
PIRG—and some of them are attorneys, some are not; we have mixed 
feelings about it.  People have noted we have to beat out of young 
lawyers some of the things they are taught in law school.  But it is 
possible, it has happened.  So we definitely hire graduating law students 
to do advocacy. 
In an organization like PIRG, with about 400 staff members around 
the country, having attorneys on staff is important; everything from 
serving as legal counsel to the program side, being in the legislature, 
helping to write the laws and craft them so they pass muster if later 
tested in court.  So PIRG certainly hires graduating law students, and I 
know that we are one of the few organizations willing to take people and 
train them.  We have a fairly rigorous training program to teach people.  
But then, as Gene said, it is really on-the-job training, learning how to do 
it.  I know that there are not that many other organizations.  But my 
advice is: find the organizations that do what you like and intern with 
them in the summers.  I know that means less money, but there are 
fellowships out there.  Get the experience.  Some of those other 
organizations that would not traditionally hire somebody right out of law 
school will hire you if you worked there for the summer.  But I leave 
that to my fellow panelists to confirm. 
GENE KIMMELMAN:  
We have just instituted a fellowship program.  We only have one slot 
now in our Washington, D.C. office.  Our San Francisco office has 
traditionally had fellowships.  Our Texas office has tried.  What we are 
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trying to do now is to go to foundations to support the training of 
advocates.  I have one slot created that way through a Ford Foundation 
grant in telecommunications.  So it is very difficult, but we are trying to 
make some opportunities available, and there ought to be a lot more.  
This is one of the areas requiring foundation help. 
JAMIE COURT:  
We are hiring.  I would say to the law students that there are so few 
public interest lawyers in America that if you work really hard and really 
care, you can make a big difference.  It is one of the few professions you 
could go into where you get your phone, your computer, your territory, 
and you can change an awful lot of lives.  It is really worth doing. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
David, there is a piece of it that no one has mentioned.  There are an 
enormous number of good legislators, people who are trying to do the 
right thing, who are looking for staff on a regular basis. 
JAMIE COURT:  
Did you say an enormous number? 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
Nationwide, you add them all up together and there are a dozen or so.  
No, there really are, and there are terrific opportunities working with a 
legislator—with somebody inside the process.  It is a different way of being an 
advocate.  But do not kid yourself, the amount of good that can be done and 
the skills that can be developed in that process are often very substantial. 
JAMIE COURT:  
But if the legislator frustrates you, do not think that is really the public 
interest world.  The games played as a legislative aide often times are not 
the games played in the public interest world.  There is a big difference.  I 
do think it is a good learning experience, but you have to be careful whom 
you choose. 
DAVID VLADECK:  
I have two questions about the democratic process.  I would like to 
direct at least the first to Charlie.  Both questions ask about the renewal 
of democracy.  One asks the question about whether other means of 
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voting, such as to try to get away from the winner takes all theory of our 
electoral system, might ultimately improve the electoral process.  The 
other question asks a related question: voters are having a difficult time 
identifying candidates who genuinely have public interest roots.  There 
is no truth in advertising when it comes to political candidates.  What 
measures do you think can be used, other than those the Supreme Court 
recently struck down regarding term limits, so voters have a better sense 
of where candidates stand on issues that are important to them? 
CHARLES HALPERN:  
This is the moment for serious public debate about a range of 
alternatives, such as the multimember district, proportional representation 
and the like, also electronic voting, the idea of an election day 
holiday—a forty-eight-hour voting period which would make it easier 
for people to get to the polls, and same day registration—where you can 
register on election day.  Six states now have same day registration in 
place29 and, not surprisingly, they are among the states with the highest 
voter participation.  So there is a lot of experimentation that can be done, 
and I think it is very much in the interest of all public interest lawyers to 
participate in that experimental process. 
With regard to truth in advertising in the electoral process, my first 
impulse is to have a kind of a First Amendment response, because that is a 
hazardous business to try to police.  I would go very slowly toward doing 
that.  Tracy Weston in Santa Monica has pioneered a very interesting 
system of getting fuller information available about candidates on the 
Internet.  He has an ingenious system that he has been working out over 
the last few years.  That seems to be a good idea, and then voters will have 
a richer information base on which to make their own judgments. 
DAVID VLADECK:  
I have one last question.  Would it be helpful to open the lawmaking 
process by creating an Internet file for each bill where people could 
register their views on it? 
WENDY WENDLANDT:  
Sure, that would be great.  Let’s do it! 
DAVID VLADECK:  
Do you see any impediments to doing it?  Do you think the 
legislatures in your states would warmly embrace this kind of proposal? 
 
 29. The six states are: Maine, Minnesota, Idaho, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming. 
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WENDY WENDLANDT:  
They would hate it. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
 As a concept, it is a terrific idea.  Anything that allows the public to 
communicate directly and effectively helps.  I don’t think we should kid 
ourselves about how quickly the corporate world would also figure out 
how to use it and would flood it—as they did with the 800 numbers.  So 
the concept of allowing more direct, frequent, and effective communication 
is a vitally important one, but it needs to be thought about carefully. 
WENDY WENDLANDT:  
I was reading a story the other day about the volume of e-mail that 
Congress receives, and the percentage that is responded to or even read 
now is incredibly small.  So that is the problem with e-mail; there is a 
sort of tally system about how many come in, but as soon as its 
importance is reduced to numbers, it is easy for somebody to just send 
out a manipulated and false registration of public will. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
You know, David, if you remember when we were doing the McCain 
tobacco legislation in 1998, the tobacco companies spent tens of millions 
of dollars to flood congressional offices.  So it’s a system that can be 
worked for both good and bad. 
GENE KIMMELMAN:  
I can’t think of a bill I ever worked on in Congress where it ever went 
to a vote without having a substitute amendment introduced hours, if not 
minutes, before it was actually brought up for consideration.  It could be 
a change in five words or it could be entirely different.  So the obstacles 
are enormous to achieving the public input goal. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
Let me give each of the panelists just one minute to wrap up.  Wendy, 
why don’t you start. 
WENDY WENDLANDT:  
I want to talk about two things in closing.  One of which I have said 
throughout, which is “little d” democracy.  I think there is a real danger 
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that the public interest community forgets its roots and forgets that our 
power is with the people.  The more the process, at whatever stage, puts 
power in the hands of the people, the better it is for us. 
The second thing is that the challenge of our work is largely about 
building institutions that can continue to take on these issues as they 
come up.  I work on the genetic engineering issue a lot.  We did not even 
know that issue existed fifteen years ago.  Suddenly, it is an important 
issue, and having institutions that can take on issues year after year as 
they arise is extremely important.  Those are my two closing thoughts. 
GENE KIMMELMAN:  
On top of institution building, which I do think is critical, we are 
missing a tremendous opportunity to try to develop greater intensity to 
the public, not just in crisis, but regarding things we know people care 
about.  We need to bring them into the process.  So what we need to do 
is to reach out to the institutions that exist.  To reach out to people who 
identify themselves by family, we need to appeal to the interests of their 
children or their parents that they care about.  We need to reach out to 
people who identify themselves ethnically, people who identify 
themselves through community leaders, through religion.  We need to 
make our message fit with how those people perceive themselves.  
Otherwise, I do not think our institutions will work. 
CHARLES HALPERN:  
I would like to see steps taken to build a greater sense of community 
in the public interest law world.  We need the kind of institutional 
network in the public interest law world that will increase our long term 
capacity, our capacity to renew ourselves by recruiting and training new 
people.  I would like to see us in the public interest law world try to 
assure a contemplative dimension in our work, in our institutions, and in 
our personal lives so that our zeal to do good does not lead us to trample 
the kinds of behavior that are important to our own well being, to our 
families, and, in the long term, to the cause that we want to serve. 
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JAMIE COURT:  
I think we need to work together to build capacity, to share messages, 
and to build messages.  We have many different skills in this 
community, and when we take on a legislative agenda, we have to cover 
all the components: the meeting, the message, and the lobby.  Sometimes 
litigation is a big part of that.  Sometimes we can file cases that further 
an issue.  We have to find ways to build capacity and to work together. 
Then the big thing we really need to think about is the message—
finding a new vocabulary to communicate to this world that has been 
overrun with corporate messages for twenty-five years, messages that 
have been unanswered.  We need to find a way to answer Ralph’s 
question: how do we talk about corporate expansion and the taking over 
of social rules, ethical customs, and the law?  Until we find that 
vocabulary, we are going to be on the treadmill; so, when we find it, I 
hope we all use it. 
MATTHEW MYERS:  
I think the fact that we have devoted so much of this session to 
something other than talking about the rules of change is an honest 
and accurate reflection of the relative importance of the different 
issues we have discussed. 
I have two specific closing thoughts, including one we have not 
even mentioned.  But given the hybrid nature of influencing the 
legislative process, it is important.  It is directly tied to the real 
democratic process: we as a public interest law movement need to 
look more like America.  We need to look less White, less male.  We 
need to, as the earlier topic on campaign finance reform noted, not be 
“doing for others,” but rather all working together.  That needs to be 
a high priority and one that would lead toward Charlie’s goal of a 
public interest community. 
Finally, I think we do have to remember the critical fact that, even 
more than in the judicial process or the agency process, legislatures 
are guided by an electoral system that involves winning over a broad 
base of support from a large number of people.  That lodestar is 
essential for the kind of public interest change we want.  It is 
absolutely critical even for sustaining the agency change or the 
changes we want in the courtrooms, because it is too easy to overturn 
them if we do not cover the broader base.  As public interest lawyers, 
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whether our skills fit the courtroom or the legislative arena, the 
broader lessons of this session need to be front and center in all the 
work we do. 
I want to thank the panelists, who I felt were terrific, and I 
appreciate everything you brought to the session today. 
 
